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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit, at the European University Institute, 
was created to further three main goals. First, to continue the 
development of the European University Institute as a forum for 
critical discussion of key items on the Community agenda. 
Second, to enhance the documentation available to scholars of 
European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual research projects 
on topics of current interest to the European Communities. Both 
as in-depth background studies and as policy analyses in their own 
right, these projects should prove valuable to Community policy­
making .
In October 1984, the EPU, in collaboration with the University of 
Strasbourg and TEPSA, organised a conference to examine in detail 
the Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union. This Working 
Paper, presented at the conference and revised in light of the 
discussion, will appear in book form later in 1985 along with 
other studies of the Draft Treaty.
Further information about the work of the European Policy Unit can 


























































































































































































Many people regard the Community budget and the 
present financial problems as being of a strictly fiscal 
or technical nature. They look upon the budget as a 
book-keeping exercise which has nothing to do with the 
structure and contents of the Community system. This is 
a wrong approach. Past experience, not only for the 
life span of the European Communities, but also the 
evolution of nation states, has given ample proof of 
the budget as a hinge in the historical process.
The American rebellion against British colonial rule 
was based upon a small fiscal question, but the political 
importance has never been forgotten. "No taxation without 
representation". The American rebellion was set in 
motion by a discontent of being taxed without having 
the right to determine the size of the taxation and 
for what purpose money was collected.
A large part of history concerning the establishment 
of the nineteenth century of the German Empire is a 
history of taxation. During that period of human 
history the main source of government revenue was 
customs duties. No wonder, then, that the first step 
towards unification of the German states was the 
Zollverein in 1830.
It is an indisputable fact that no state can be 
created without having access to revenue. Furthermore, 
the size of revenue will very often determine the scope 
of development of a new nation state.
On top of these economic and financial considerations 
comes the institutional and legal aspect of which 
institution has the powers to collect revenue and to 
determine the size and composition of the expenditure 
side of the budget.
Much of Europe's history is a tale of continuous 
struggle between king and parliament, about exactly 
that question. The king wanted to spend, but needed 



























































































revenue. Parliament, on the other hand, did not want to 
spend and tried to limit the room of manoeuvre of the 
king with the unavoidable result that an institutional 
clash followed. On the surface the struggle was about 
money, but in reality it was about who governs the 
realm: the king or the parliament.
No wonder, then, that in recent years the budget 
has come to the forefront of Community life.
Financially, the substance and composition of the 
budget determine financial flows between citizens, 
regions and sectors in the Community, but abov 11
between member states. There is general agreement that 
the financial flows which appear in the budget 
constitute only part - and some people think a very 
minor part - of the economic and financial consequences 
for the individual member state of the Community. 
However, this has not prevented these flows from being 
used in a highly political battle to change the 
structure of the budget.
At present, the Community's budget authority is
made up of three institutions: Council, Parliament,
1 ) 2 )Commission. The treaty was revised in 1970 and 1975 
to increase Parliament's influence on the budget, 
generally in the area of the so-called non-obligatory 
spending.
This was regarded as a milestone ten years ago, but 
Parliament now takes the view that these increased 
powers are insignificant, indeed totally unsatisfactory.
Pending the possibilities for a further change in 
the treaty which has not until now found propitious 
ground in the Council, Parliament has continuously 
tried to expand its powers by interpreting the treaty to 
its own advantage every time the budgetary procedure has 
produced a difference of opinion between Council and 
Parliament.
Not surprisingly this has led to a constant battle 
between Council and Parliament during the annual budget 




























































































Council as the defender. There is no need to go over 
that familiar ground. Suffice it to say that Parliament 
has won certain limited victories, but grosso modo the 
distribution of powers is still as foreseen when Budget 
Treaty II was implemented in 1975.
Since 1977, only two budgets (the 1978 budget and 
the 1983 budget) have been approved without any dis­
agreement of legal or political nature between Council 
and Parliament. Parliament has rejected one budget (the 
1980 budget). Council took Parliament to court on the 
1982 budget, but did not pursue the matter as a 
settlement was made. Three countries took Parliament 
to court on the 1981 budget, but did not pursue the 
matter. For the 1979 budget and 1984 budget there was 
disagreement between the two institutions on whether 
the amount of non-obligatory spending complied with 
the rules laid down by the maximum rate of increase or 
whether a new rate had to be fixed by mutual agreement.
Some people maintain that the reason for Parliament's 
attitude towards the budget is that Parliament has no 
powers with regard to the Community's legislative 
process which makes it unavoidable that Parliament 
directs its efforts towards the one area where the 
treaty provides powers, that is the budget.
This theory may provide part of the answer but to 
our mind the main reason is quite simply that Parliament 
has grasped that the road to influence on Community life 
and the structure of the Community system is by way of 
the budget.
This leads to the starting point of this report, 
which is that the budget and the distribution of 
budgetary powers on the three institutions are of 
fundamental importance for the structure of the 
Community system and the way the Community will tend 
to develop for the rest of this century.
We are not dealing with technical questions which 
are only open for experts but with a political question 





























































































II. The present Community budget
1. Size of the budget
The Community budget is small compared with national 
budgets as well as gross domestic product in the 
Community.
Since 1973 the Community budget has amounted to 
between 1.8% and 2.7% of national budgets.
At the lower end of the range we find 1975 with 1.8% 
and at the top we have 1979 and 1980 with 2.7%.
Compared with gross domestic product the percentage 
has fluctuated between 0.51% (in 1974) and 0.91% (in 
1981) .
There is no need to elaborate on the fact that we 
are operating with very small figures which have a very 
limited impact on national economies and play a minor 
role in the integration process.
The main reason why the Community budget has not 
grown faster is that except for the common agricultural 
policy, common policies are still of an embryonic nature.
The hard fact is that the member states have not been 
willing to design and adopt common policies giving rise 
to expenditure over a broad level, but have been quite 
content to confine the activities of the Community to 
the common agricultural policy. This seems often to be 
overlooked in the debate on the Community's structure.
2. Expenditure
This picture is borne out by an analysis of the 
expenditure side of the budget.
It is dominated by the common agricultural policy 
which in the period from 1973 to 1984 has taken up 
between 60% and 80% of total expenditure.
Both the absolute amounts and the share of the total 
budget have fluctuated rather wildly over the years.
The highest share was realized in 1973, but 1978 comes 
close. The lowest point was obtained in the beginning 




























































































This revenue source cannot claim the same link to 
the contents of the Community system as is the case 
for customs duties and agricultural import levies.
There are two reasons why the Community introduced 
the VAT as a financial source. Firstly, it fitted in 
nicely with the efforts to harmonize the basis of 
indirect taxation in the Community. Secondly, VAT 
taxes consumption and not investment.
It is interesting to note that the inclusion of 
VAT means a certain progressivity in the financing of 
the Community as consumption per head is higher, in the 
richer member states than in the poorer ones.
Even if this was not an explicit purpose it goes 
some way to meet the claims of progressivity on the 
revenue side of the budget, which have been made 
by some member states in recent years.
Table 2 presents the total financial resources at 
the disposal of the Community in the period 1973 to 
1984 and the importance of the main revenue sources.
The table bears out that the agricultural import 
levies are volatile while the customs duties cannot be 
expected to increase significantly. Thus the only 
buoyant element is VAT.
4. Significant elements in the Community's financing
system_______________________________________________
Viewed in a historical perspective, the financing 
system of the Community is unique in several aspects.
First of all, member states are legally committed 
to pay into the budget what is necessary to finance the 
common activities adopted by the Council (provided 
of course that the revenue needed does not surpass the 
VAT ceiling). This means in fact that the financing of 
the Community is not dependent on national contributions 
voted by national parliaments. A refusal by a member 
state to pay according to the rules of the own-resources 
system would constitute a breach of an international 




























































































Justice would rule in such a case. The Community does 
not work under the threat of individual member states 
withholding financial resources unless they are 
accommodated in one way or another. The contrast to the 
financing of traditional international institutions 
is very clear, indeed.
Secondly, the financing of the Community is not 
linked to the economic clout of the member states, 
for example gross domestic product, but reflects the 
two corner-stones of the Community, that is the customs 
union and the common agricultural policy. Also in this 
respect the Community breaks with the financing system 
of traditional international institutions.
These two factors are the basis for the own resources 
system which is one of the most significant elements of 
the Community structure. The first factor means that 
the Community has access to financial resources from 
the time they are collected in member states. This is 
why they are own resources. The second factor underlines 
that we are dealing with a Community with ten member 
states and not a loose international cooperation 
encompassing ten national states.
Ill. The Community's budgetary procedure
1. Different types of appropriations
The treaty distinguishes between obligatory and non- 
obligatory spending.
Obligatory spending is expenditure which necessarily 
results from the treaty or from acts adopted in accordance 
therewith.
Typical examples are appropriations for FEOGA and 
agreements with third countries.
Non-obligatory spending is expenditure which does 
not necessarily result from the treaty or from acts 
adopted in accordance therewith.





























































































The distinction between the two types of spending 
is of paramount importance for the budgetary procedure 
and the distribution of powers among the three insti­
tutions which constitute the budget authority.
The Commission has the right of initiative in this 
as in other areas.
The Council has the final decision with regard to 
the size and composition of obligatory expenditure.
This is logical. It is the Council which adopts the 
legal acts which constitute the basis for expenditure. 
Accordingly, it must be up to the Council to decide the 
amount necessary to carry out the obligations which 
follow from these legal acts. It is in accordance with 
the fact that Parliament does not have any legislative 
power that the powers of Parliament concerning obligatory 
spending are very limited.
Had Parliament been given powers with regard to 
obligatory spending, it would have been possible for 
Parliament to obtain legislative powers via the 
budgetary system. By reducing or increasing obligatory 
spending Parliament would have forced the Council 
either to change the legal acts or to face a situation 
where the Community could not fulfil its legal commit­
ments .
This is a case in point that the Community system 
with regard to distribution of powers among institutions 
as well as the structure of the common policies and 
their financing is far more coherent and well thought 
out than most people think when they first meet the 
very complicated Community system.
With Budget Treaty II of 1975 Parliament got 
influence on the size and composition of non-obligatory 
spending.
Parliament has the final word with regard to size 
as well as composition, provided that the rules for 





























































































As non-obligatory spending does not result from the 
treaty or legal acts it is up to the Community 
institutions to fix the amount for the common activities 
according to political priority. There are no legally 
binding commitments. The exclusive power of the Council 
in the legislative process does not prevent Parliament 
from influencing the size of appropriations for headings 
in the budget which are classified as non-obligatory 
spending.
There is a gap in the treaty in the sense that it 
does not specify which appropriations are obligatory 
and which are non-obligatory.
For a good many years this question was not raised 
during the annual budgetary procedure. The existing 
classification was taken for granted by all. three 
institutions.
This peaceful situation was broken in the autumn of 
1981 when Parliament unilaterally changed the classi­
fication of some items in the budget and unilaterally 
decided to classify certain new items as non-obligatory 
spending.
This was a matter of principle for the Council and 
as a political solution was not reached the Council 
took Parliament to the Court of Justice.
During the spring of 1982 a political settlement was 
worked out which was signed June 30 1982 by the 
Presidents of the three institutions. This common 
declaration contained several new elements but the most 
important one for the classification question is that 
it lists the disputed items and maps out a procedure 
to be followed in case of disagreement in the future.
The common declaration did not prevent Parliament 
from unilaterally breaking the agreement with the 
Council in the second half of 1983 concerning the 
classification of amounts to be paid out to Britain.
Parliament has for a long time wished to change the 




























































































obligatory and non-obligatory spending. This is, indeed, 
one of the major points of the draft treaty establishing 
the European Union, which we will take up later.
2. Existing powers of the three institutions
According to the treaty there is a clear-cut 
distribution of powers among the three institutions 
which constitute the budget authority.
The Commission forwards a preliminary draft budget 
and takes part in the Council's deliberations and the
Imeetings in Parliament and Parliament's budgetary 
committee. The role of the Commission in the budgetary 
procedure is thus very much like the Commission's 
general role as the initiator and the guardian of the 
treaty.
The Council decides on the draft budget which is 
forwarded to Parliament. Legally this takes the form 
of a Council decision. It is the Council which has the 
final word with regard to obligatory spending while 
the fixing of non-obligatory spending partly falls 
under the competence of Parliament.
It is the President of Parliament who declares that 
the budget has been finally adopted.
If important reasons warrant it, Parliament may 
reject the draft budget and request that a new draft 
be submitted to it.
Furthermore, Parliament has the final word with 
regard to the composition of non-obligatory spending.
The treaty implicates a sort of ping-pong between 
Council and Parliament. Council forwards a draft budget 
before a deadline. Parliament makes amendments (non- 
obligatory spending) and proposes modifications 
(obligatory spending) within 45 days and it is up to 
the Council to act on these proposals. When Council 
has decided on the proposed modifications the 
budgetary procedure for obligatory spending has been 




























































































decisions are communicated to Parliament which completes 
the budgetary procedure by finally deciding on non- 
obligatory spending at its December session.
By and large, this procedure has served the Com­
munity well and is a good example of how to distribute 
powers among various institutions with the aim of 
establishing an interplay leading up to a final decision 
backed by the consent of all involved.
This, however, supposes that all the institutions 
play by the rules. There are two snags in this 
assumption.
Firstly, the rules do not always cover the whole 
spectrum of possible problems, and even if they do the 
institutions do not always reach the same interpretation.
A typical example of this is that the treaty contains 
only a general classification of obligatory versus 
non-obligatory spending.
If and when a difference of opinions arises, it 
places the institutions in the dilemma of either having 
to negotiate a common interpretation of the said question 
or to take the matter to the Court of Justice, on the 
allegation that one of the institutions has acted 
illegally.
Experience shows that Parliament has found it quite 
attractive to try to find out just how far it can go 
before the Council finds that a major shift in powers 
is taking place.
This is a highly political game with the Council 
trying to defend its prerogatives without really 
knowing where to put down its foot and how firmly to 
defend its position.
Since 1975 Parliament has definitely gained much 
greater influence on the budgetary procedure by 
gradually pushing the interpretation of the treaty 
in the direction wished by Parliament. The aim 
has generally been to make room for a steeper increase 




























































































Secondly, the budgetary procedure, as laid down in 
the treaty, is of legal nature.
It does not preclude that the institutions circumvent 
the treaty and fix an important part of the budget by 
a mutual agreement.
Such a procedure means that political considerations 
replace the strictly legal procedure. As long as all 
three institutions are agreed that this can be done, 
it is possible to do it that way. Who shall take the 
matter to the Court of Justice with the allegation that 
one of the other institutions has acted illegally if 
there is political agreement between the three 
institutions?
It is in this respect that recent years have shown 
the biggest slide in the budgetary procedure compared 
with the strict rules in the treaty.
The first and most spectacular example is what has 
happened to the maximum rate of • increase. The treaty 
clearly specifies how to apply a complex set of rules 
to respect this rate but adds that another rate may be 
fixed by agreement between Council and Parliament.
Reading the treaty no one can have any doubt that 
the possibility of fixing another rate is some sort of 
escape clause to be used when special circumstances 
make it appropriate. Otherwise, there would be no 
reason for having the complex set of rules when this 
special paragraph could be replaced by one sentence 
saying that the size of non-obligatory spending is 
fixed by Council and Parliament by agreement.
This interpretation notwithstanding, Parliament has 
forced a level of non-obligatory spending which 
surpasses the maximum rate of increase for practically 
all Community budgets since the late 1970s.
The driving force behind this has been the demand 
put forward by Parliament that there is a political 
need in the Community for a higher level of spending.




























































































that gradually the procedure in the treaty is being 
replaced by political considerations.
This became crystal clear in the second half of 
1983 when the draft budget for 1984 was being discussed. 
Parliament unilaterally rejected an earlier agreement 
between Council and Parliament concerning classification 
of the amounts to be paid out to Britain. Furthermore, 
Parliament put forward, not as a suggestion but as a 
claim, that agricultural spending should be reduced 
by a considerable amount.
What was alarming about this claim was not that it 
was made but that it was not made according to the 
rules of the treaty. According to the treaty Parliament 
should have put forward a modification to reduce 
agricultural spending. This modification would have 
been approved unless rejected by Council by a qualified 
majority. After the Council decision during the Council's 
second reading in the middle of November 1983 the 
budgetary procedure for agricultural expenditure would 
have been finished as at this point we are dealing with 
obligatory expenditure.
Instead, Parliament put forward its claim at a 
special meeting between Council and Parliament, called 
during Parliament's final session in the middle of 
December 1983. Parliament did recognize that the 
budgetary procedure for agricultural spending had 
been finished but supported its claim by pleading the 
important political considerations.
Fortunately, for the respect of the treaty, Council 
did not budge but chose in this case to stand firm and 
tell Parliament that its claim could not be met as the 
budgetary procedure for agricultural spending had been 
completed a month ago.
3. Conclusion
The danger of the present budgetary procedure is not 




























































































pretations can be put forward but that one institution, 
Parliament, is fundamentally dissatisfied with the 
whole structure of the budgetary procedure.
Parliament is of the opinion that the strict 
budgetary procedure, as laid down in the treaty, should 
be replaced by a continuous, political negotiation from 
start to end of the budgetary procedure.
As it is the President of Parliament who declares 
the budget finally adopted it gives Parliament the 
upper hand in the sense that unless Parliament is 
satisfied a legally adopted budget will not be available 
from the beginning of the budget year.
The Council has resisted this attempt not only 
because it would greatly increase Parliament's influence 
on the budget but also because Council cannot renounce - 
not even implicitly - the treaty. It would create a 
precedent in other areas.
It is open to interpretation which line the newly 
elected Parliament will follow but most indications are 
that it will continue the road taken by the former 
Parliament.
If that happens Council will in a few years, perhaps 
sooner, come to a crossroads where it must make the 
political decision between either facing up to Parliament 
and maintain its prerogatives as laid down in the treaty 
or giving in to Parliament and accept a fundamental 
change in the distribution of powers concerning the 
budgetary procedure.
IV. The Community's present budgetary problems
1. Own resources
It became clear at the end of the 1970s that the own 
resources, as defined in the decision of April 1970, would 
not be sufficient to finance the Community in the future.
Continuation of present policies would not be 




























































































would tend to level off, leaving the VAT revenue as the 
only buoyant element. It is a well-known fact that the 
expenditure level for the common agricultural policy is 
highly volatile and a steep increase for a year or two 
would threaten to break through the VAT ceiling.
It would be even more difficult to launch and implement 
new common policies. At the beginning of the 1980s an 
increase of the VAT revenue for the Community of 0.1 
percentage point puts approximately 1,000 million ECU 
at the disposal of the Community. This is peanuts compared 
to what would be necessary for a broad range of new 
common policies.
In political terms, it was perhaps more important 
that the enlargement with Spain and Portugal would be 
impossible unless the financial resources at the disposal 
of the Community were increased. If the VAT ceiling was 
maintained it would mean that Spain and Portugal were to 
join quite another Community than the one they had wanted 
to be members of. Such a political venture was simply 
not feasible.
For 1982 the own resources were fully exhausted.
For 1983 the Community actually used more than was 
at its disposal under the own-resources system. The 
call-up per cent of VAT was fixed at 0.99, but 
expenditures, equal to 675 million ECU under the 
common agricultural policy were carried over to 1984.
For 1984 the Commission estimates a shortfall 
revenue amounting to approximately 2,000 million ECU.
The Commission has asked for this amount to be placed at 
the disposal of the Community by advanced payments of 
VAT revenue from the member states.
For 1985 the preliminary draft budget of the 
Commission envisages a shortfall of approximately 1,900 
million ECU.
The Commission intends to solve this problem by 




























































































effect from October 1 1985 which will make it possible
to operate with a call-up per cent of VAT for the whole 
of 1985 of 1.12%.
It took several years and was very difficult to 
agree on an increase of the VAT ceiling from 1% to 1.4%.
This must not obscure the fact that this increase will 
hardly be sufficient to tide the Community over until 
the end of the 1980s.
If we start on the assumption that the preliminary 
draft for 1985 is based on correct data the Community 
will sail into the new era of increased VAT resources
l
with a VAT per cent of 1.12. Add to this an estimate of 
0.2% which will be needed to finance the enlargement and 
the astonishing fact is that a new and further increase 
will impose itself. The European Council has partly 
foreseen this which is why a further increase to 1.6 
taking effect in 1988 is mentioned as a possibility.
The unavoidable and disheartening conclusion is that 
the Community may be able to finance itself until 1990 
on the basis of a VAT per cent of 1.4 or 1.6 but only 
on the condition that the structure of the common 
activities is frozen in its present shape.
We will thus six years from now see a Community with 
one predominant common policy giving rise to expenditure, 
namely the common agricultural policy, and the balance 
of the financial resources used mainly to finance the 
enlargement.
No new common policies giving rise to expenditure 
will have been launched and implemented and the 
Community system will be just as unbalanced as it has 
been for the last five-ten years.
It is remarkable that this has not really been 
understood when the financial problems were negotiated. 
Only a few countries supported a VAT increase to between 
1.5 and 2%. Most member states were quite happy that 
the VAT increase was limited to 1.4%. Among them were 




























































































for years advocated a better balance between the 
Community's common policies but when the Community 
came to the crossroads they were not willing to place 
the financial resources necessary to implement such a 
policy at the disposal of the Community.
2. Budgetary discipline
A new concept has been born during the recent 
negotiations on the Community's future financing: 
budgetary discipline. I
Until the meeting of the European Council ip June 1983 
budgetary discipline was a concept which was hardly 
known in Community circles, but after that juncture it 
has risen in importance with every meeting of the 
European Council.
The main idea of budgetary discipline is to define a 
financial framework for total Community expenditure.
Before each budgetary year it is decided how much total 
expenditure is allowed to increase and the budget must be 
drawn up with respect of that ceiling.
During the first half of 1984 this approach was 
further refined in the sense that a separate ceiling for 
agricultural expenditure and for non-obligatory 
expenditure was worked out.
For agricultural expenditure the idea is that the 
annual increase shall be lower than the growth rate of 
the own resources. Both figures are to be calculated 
on a base covering three years.
Furthermore, account has to be taken of special 
circumstances, in particular following from the enlarge­
ment. This phrase means that the general rule is not 
to be applied in a strict sense but may be abrogated 
if and when it is deemed necessary.
It was primarily Britain, supported by the Netherlands 
and the Federal Republic of Germany, which managed to 
get approval of this idea.
For non-obligatory spending agreement was reached 




























































































for the coming budgets. To respect this aim the member 
states took it upon themselves to decide on a draft 
budget inside half of the maximum rate which leaves 
the other half at the disposal of Parliament.
It is not difficult to see the political aim of 
budgetary discipline but it is, indeed, a strange 
animal in the Community zoo. It is without any foundation 
in the treaty or the acquis communautaire.
Firstly, it is doubtful, to put it mildly, whether 
budgetary discipline as agreed upon by the Council is 
in conformity with the treaty. It may be said that the 
Council is free to impose upon itself any sort of 
discipline but this can hardly be right when the rules 
infringe the powers of other institutions or runs 
contradictory to the treaty.
The idea of fixing a framework for total expenditure 
before the budgetary procedure is not foreseen in the 
treaty and may, indeed, be said to limit the Commission's 
right of initiative. What is left of this right if the 
Council has announced beforehand that whatever the 
Commission puts forward and whichever arguments are used 
to support it, the Council has already decided what to do?
The interplay between the institutions is more or 
less violated in the sense that the Council has decided 
not to use the last paragraph of Article 203, 9, which 
foresees the possibility of fixing a new and higher 
maximum rate of increase. What is the purpose of having 
this paragraph in the treaty if one of the institutions 
decides that it cannot be used? Parliament can
rightly say that the finely-tuned budgetary procedure has 
unilaterally been set aside by the Council in the sense 
that the end result with regard to total expenditure 
as well as its distribution on obligatory and non- 
obligatory appropriations has been decided in advance 
by the Council.
The ceiling for agricultural expenditure may be said 
to question the contents of what is called obligatory 




























































































fixed at the amount which followed automatically from 
legal acts adopted by the council. The amount of obliga­
tory expenditure was, as it were, determined by the 
contents of the legal acts and not to be fixed at an 
arbitrary level by the Council.
If the ceiling is to be respected the Council has 
only two possibilities. The first one is to make 
arbitrary cuts in agricultural spending so that the 
budgetary ceiling replaces the legal acts as the decisive 
vehicle for the size of agricultural spending. This would 
mean that the concept of obligatory spending was de 
facto removed from the vocabulary of the Community. The 
second one is to tell the Agricultural Ministers that 
they must shape a common agricultural policy for which 
expenditure does not surpass the ceiling. This is, of 
course, feasible, at least in theory, but it means that 
the policy-making of the Community is moved from one 
Council (agriculture) to another (budget). Furthermore, 
an interesting clash would occur in case the Agricultural 
Ministers are not inclined to follow the directives 
imposed upon them by the European Council and implemented 
by the Budget Ministers.
The decision not to surpass the maximum rate of 
increase is of course perfectly legal, but it is 
questionable whether it remains so if the other 
branch of the budget authority - Parliament - does 
not agree.
Under this rule non-obligatory spending would grow 
at a very modest rate, indeed, measured in real terms.
It is very difficult to see how the Community could take 
up new common policies if the growth rate of expenditure 
for this purpose is limited to 7 or 8%. The consequence 
of this policy is thus that the Community is frozen in 
its present shape with the inevitable result that all 
problems associated with the Community's future 
financing will still be there at the end of the 1980s.
It is often said that as member states are taking 




























































































of national budgets the same should be the case where 
the Community budget is concerned.
This attitude which is comprehensible is based on a 
wrong philosophy concerning the role of the Community and 
the division of responsibility between, on the one hand, 
the nation state and, on the other hand, the Community.
The European nation states have in the past 
implemented common policies over a broad range. It is 
only natural that these policies are being scrutinized 
and that expenditure often is being trimmed. From time 
to time existing policies have to be adapted to new 
circumstances and at present nearly all member states 
face the unpleasant fact that public expenditure has 
out-grown what the economic base can sustain.
But this is not the case for the Community. The 
Community has only one common policy which gives rise 
to expenditure, namely the common agricultural policy.
For this policy exactly the same scrutiny as the one 
applied by the nation state has been carried out to 
make savings. A lot of measures have been adopted to 
this effect.
In all other areas no common policies worthy of this 
word have been implemented. A restrictive line towards 
expenditure means that no common policies are being 
shaped. It means that the distribution of responsibility 
between the nation state and the Community is being 
left to its present status.
It is, indeed, strange that no serious attempt has 
been made to allocate certain tasks to the Community 
and abandon the same tasks at a national level. Such a 
procedure would mean that the responsibility and 
expenditure would be transferred from national level to 
Community level. Total expenditure in Europe would not 
rise because national expenditure would go down and \
Community expenditure would accordingly go up. If 
policies are picked with an eye to what is suited for 
international cooperation it may even be cheaper for 




























































































instead of having ten individual nation states trying 
to do it at the same time!
The much heralded concept of budgetary discipline 
may well turn out to be a snake in the Community paradise. 
Institutionally, it may trigger off a major confrontation 
between the different branches of the budget authority. 
Legally, it is doubtful whether it is in conformity with 
the treaty. It may jeopardize the common agricultural 
policy and at the same time bar the way for new and 
other common policies.
3. Budgetary imbalance |
The most difficult point during the accession 
negotiations in 1970 and 1971 was the British contribution 
to the Community budget. When this problem was solved 
it was clear that the negotiations would be successfully 
concluded.
British calculations at that time pointed towards 
a financial burden for Britain, but it was rightly 
stressed by the other member states that the calculations 
were based upon the assumption of a static Community.
If Britain took the lead in developing the Community 
outside the agricultural sphere it would change the 
pattern of financial flows between member states.
It is interesting to note that the British criticism 
has not been static but has developed over the years.
It started as a dissatisfaction with the receipts 
side of the budget, that is the own-resources system.
The British Government took the view that as Britain's 
share of imports from non-member countries was above the 
Community average Britain would pay in customs duties 
and agricultural import levies in excess of what a GDP 
key would have led to. Apparently it did not make any 
difference that this is exactly how the own-resources 
system is supposed to work because of the Community 
preference.
This approach led to the adoption of the
4 )corrective mechanism which was agreed in principle at 




























































































A few years later the British Government evoked once 
more the budgetary problem but now it was presented in 
the sense that the so-called British net contribution 
was grossly out of line with Britain's relative standard 
of living.
In conceptual terms, this change of approach 
signified that from focusing on the receipts side only 
the British Government now also brought the expenditure 
side into the picture.
For the last five years the concept of net contribu­
tion has dominated the Community's agenda and played 
a major role in the Community's life.
This is regrettable - for several reasons.
Firstly, the British net contribution amounts to 
between 0.3% and 0.4% of the UK's gross domestic product.
The Community as such has paid a heavy price for 
trying to solve a problem which cannot be said to be of 
importance either for the Community itself or for Britain 
This goes without saying that the whole basis of
calculation of the net contribution is subject to
. . . 5)criticism
Secondly, nothing in the treaty or the acquis 
communautaire warrants the concept of net contribution.
On the receipts side the own-resources system lays 
down that the geographical place for collecting revenue 
is of no importance and that there should be no link 
between what is paid in from a member state and its share 
of Community GDP. In fact, it can be said that there is 
no such thing as member states' payments to the Community 
budget because what member states pay in belongs to the 
Community as such and the member state is only acting 
as a collector.
On the expenditure side we distinguish between 
two types of appropriations in the budget. The common 
agricultural policy is based upon the principle that 
the geographical place for payments is irrelevant. It 
should amount to the same for the individual farmer 




























































































or sells his products on the market. Thus the fact that 
a farmer in one country receives restitutions makes it 
possible for a farmer in another country to sell on the 
market at the going price. This is why we speak of a 
common policy and not of ten individual policies which 
are coordinated. For the structural funds exactly the 
opposite applies. Here we have, at least implicitly, a 
geographical key to ensure that the Community assists 
less developed regions in their endeavours to obtain 
economic growth.
This analysis shows why it makes no sense to operate 
with the concept of net contribution. The receipts side 
of the budget and the expenditure following from the 
common agricultural policy explicitly reject a 
geographical key . For the structural funds a 
geographical key has already been implemented.
The concept of net contribution is thus a mixture of 
receipts and payments - mutually incompatible - based 
on a philosophy which is in contradiction to the very 
principles of the Community system*^.
Parliament has adopted a line which has very much 
in common with the above analysis which has also been 
the case, at least partly and in softer terms, for 
nearly all other member states except Great Britain.
In the second half of 1983 and the beginning of 1984 
an attempt was made to solve the British budget problem 
by focusing exclusively on the payment side of the 
Community budget.
The philosophy behind this approach was that the 
British budget problem had arisen because of the 
imbalance between common policies and the resulting 
financial flows between member states. A glance at the 
expenditure to member states measured in per cent of 
their GDP shows that Britain receives a share far below 
the Community average. (For 1982 total expenditure 
amounted to 0.75% of Community GDP while payments to 
Britain amounted to 0.49% of the British GDP). If the 




























































































share would approach the Community average and there
would be no British budget problem. In the meantime the
Community should take upon itself to alleviate the
British problem by partly compensating the expenditure
7)shortfall
At the European Council meeting at Fontainebleau a 
mechanism was approved which does not totally follow 
this philosophy but at least has certain resemblances.
However, the fact that the Community at the same time 
decided to implement a bugetary discipline will mean that 
in four or five years' time the present imbalance between 
common policies will still exist and the British budget 
problem will return to the negotiating table.
The weak chain in the armour is that the Community 
did not decide to establish new common policies and to 
regard the mechanism to solve the British problem as a 
transitional mechanism. Instead, it must be feared that 
the mechanism is here to stay and that new common 
policies will never be permitted to take off.
4. Different philosophies towards the Community's
financing_________________ _____________________
What to the general public appears as a budgetary 
or financial question is thus a question of which 
philosophy to apply for the future development of the 
Community. The main battle is about approach and not 
about money. Even if the two things in the long run are 
intertwined.
One approach - the pure one - gives full priority to 
the contents of the Community system, that is the common 
policies, and the budget is allocated a role very much 
in the background. What matters are the legal acts and 
the substantial decisions taken by the Council. The 
budget is merely a book-keeping account which reflects 
these decisions but does not have any impact on policy.
If expenditure is rising too fast or if a budgetary 
imbalance arises the problem is not a budgetary or 




























































































Community system works as intended. The budget is the 
instrument which sets off the alarm but any correction 
has to be taken via a change or an adaption of the 
existing legal acts. The budget has no role in policy­
making .
The own resources should be expanded considerably.
The increase of the VAT ceiling to 1.4% and possibly a 
further increase to 1.6% is regarded as totally 
insufficient. There must be enough financial manoeuvring 
room to permit the development of new common policies 
while at the same time the existing common policies are 
continued grosso modo in their present shape.
The role of the own-resources system is to provide 
financing of the common policies adopted by the Council.
In principle, no financial ceiling should be applied as 
this will implicitly act as a brake on efforts to 
further the integration process.
Budgetary discipline as worked out during the first 
half of 1984 is some sort of anathema to this approach.
For obligatory spending expenditure follows what is 
necessary to implement the common policies. For non- 
obligatory spending, appropriations necessary to launch 
and implement new common policies should be approved.
This does not mean that the Community should spend without 
taking into account the harsher financial climate but 
that a financial straitjacket is totally out of order.
An analogy to national policies is rejected on the 
basis that a Community in an embryonic phase must 
necessarily face a rapid increase in spending as 
common policies are gradually accelerating.
The concept of net contribution does not belong in 
this context. The own-resources system works as designed 
and the expenditure side of the budget may be changed if 
there is a need for it but, if so, it must be done by 
way of the common policies and not by intervention in 
the budget itself.
The other approach - the budgetary one - is looking 





























































































The budget must work inside a rigorous financial 
framework and produce equitable financial results for 
each member state. If something is wrong with the 
budget it should be remedied at once by direct changes 
in the budgetary and financial mechanisms. If such steps 
are incompatible with the existing common policies and 
the legal acts adopted by the Council, these have to 
be changed to produce the necessary budgetary and 
financial results. First priority is thus given to 
the budget and all the rest has to follow as best it 
can. It does not really matter what we do or what we 
do not do in conformity or not with the Community 
system as long as the budgetary results are satis­
factory.
The analytic base for the Community system and its 
budget is approximately the same as for a grocer's shop.
Expenditure must not exceed revenue and if it does 
happen expenditure has to be cut to fit the revenue 
available.
A higher VAT ceiling can only be contemplated when 
a rigorous savings policy has not brought down 
expenditure to the level of revenue.
Budgetary discipline has been consecrated in this 
approach. If only the Community can bring its expenditure 
into line all will be well. It does not matter that 
the common agricultural policy is jeopardized and that 
the integration process is being brought to an abrupt 
stop.
In this approach there is a strict analogy to the 
nation state. When the individual member state has to 
save the Community must also save. The effect of this, 
namely that an existing national policy.is being trimmed 
while the common policy of the Community is being killed 
before it even gets off the ground is not being 
discussed.
Budgetary imbalance is another key word in this 
approach. The budget must show an equitable burden 




























































































Community is producing a surplus but is, however, not 
used). Failing that, the budgetary system including 
the own-resources system should be changed. This should 
not be done by adapting the common policies to bring 
about a better balance but by way of direct changes 
in the budgetary system as such.
This underlines the difference in conceptual terms 
between those who on the one hand have talked about a 
better balance between common policies and those who 
have used the term a better budgetary balance. This may 
sound as a question of semantics but is not at ^11 so.
It is a question of how you approach the very principles 
of the Community system and which role to assign to the 
budget.
Until 1980 the first approach (the pure approach) 
was the only one in the Community. There was no talk 
about budgetary discipline or budgetary imbalance and 
the concept of net contribution was never heard of.
The founding fathers of the Community had with great 
skill drawn up a Community which was logic in the sense 
that the substantial decisions taken by the Council were 
the determining factor and the budget did not play any 
role as such in policy-making.
The reason for this is not difficult to comprehend. 
It was the only way to further the integration process 
where new common policies could continuously be launched 
and implemented.
In this conceptual framework the driving force is 
new decisions and the financing is being provided by the 
member states without questioning the growth rate of 
expenditure or the financial result for each individual 
member state.
The founding fathers realized that a Community where 
the financial aspect is predominant would stop the 
integration process. Member states would try to save 
money (either to reduce total spending or to use the • 
amount at national level) and member states would only 
support the common policy if the difference between 




























































































This prediction of what one or the other of the two 
approaches would mean for the European integration 
process has indeed been borne out by experience during 
the last five - ten years.
Around 1980 the picture changed in the sense that 
the pure approach was no longer the only approach. One 
member state, with more or less firm support from one 
or two other member states, introduced the budgetary 
approach.
The heart of the matter of the negotiations on the 
Community's future financing for the last five years 
has been whether the pure approach should continue to 
be the predominant one or whether it should be replaced 
by the budgetary approach.
This has been difficult to realise because tangible 
factors such as financial flows and money have been in 
the forefront of the picture. However, digging a little 
deeper we see clearly that the money question has only 
been a skirmish while the main battle concerning the 
conceptual basis for the Community has raged in the 
background.
The solution reached by the European Council at 
Fontainebleau in June 1984 may be said to safeguard the 
essential elements of the pure approach while at the 
same time it accommodates important elements of the 
budgetary approach. It is thus a political compromise 
and as such it will undoubtedly place the Community in 
a difficult situation when necessary decisions are to 
be taken in the years ahead.
The battle has not been won by any party but a 
ceasefire has been concluded in the hope that the 
problems will diminish as the Community develops further. 
That is a pious hope and it remains to be seen whether 
it will be fulfilled.
5. The position of the European Parliament
The European Parliament has for many years supported 




























































































that up to the mid-1970s Parliament put forward many 
ideas for new common policies. After that period, however, 
Parliament's attention has gradually focused more on 
institutional questions than on the contents of the 
Community system. Parliament has devoted more and more 
time to obtain increased powers and more influence on 
the decision-making procedure with the inevitable result 
that less time has been available for dealing with the 
common policies.
With regard to the budgetary question Parliament has 
always defended what we termed the pure approach in the 
analysis under point 3 above.
Not only has Parliament been a steadfast supporter of 
the Community system but it has maintained its procedure 
concerning the budgetary system and its role even in a 
period where several member states have been willing to 
consider important changes.
On many occasions Parliament has pointed out the 
pitfalls and weaknesses in the special arrangements 
agreed in the Council as temporary solutions to the 
British budget problem. Parliament has called for a 
permanent solution in conformity with the principles of 
the Community system and within the framework of the 
existing own-resources system.
With regard to own resources Parliament has taken the 
view that the existing one per cent VAT ceiling is 
totally insufficient to finance the Community. Parliament 
has asked for abandonment of the ceiling or at least 
introduction of a more flexible procedure to lift the 
ceiling if and when the need arises.
Parliament has been heavily criticized for being 
a spendthrift and it is correct to say that the word 
budgetary discipline does not play a predominant role 
in Parliament's vocabulary. This is, however, not 
surprising in view of Parliament's general philosophy 
regarding the Community system. Parliament's position- 
is also more nuanced. Parliament has tried to impose 




























































































Council, without much success. Nor has the attempt to 
increase non-obligatory spending been successful as the 
Council has not provided the necessary legal basis for 
new common policies.
The British budget problem or rather the term 
budgetary imbalance has been regarded by Parliament as 
a result of the imbalance in the Community system and 
not as a strictly budgetary or financial problem.
Parliament's views on the philosophy behind the 
Community system and the role of the budgetary system 
are thus logical and correspond closely to the approach 
which dominated the Community scene until 1980.
Parliament is the only institution which has been 
able to define and maintain a coherent view on the 
problem of the future financing of the Community. The 
Council has been under constant pressure from one member 
state with more or less support from a few others. The 
Commission has found it difficult to map out the narrow 
road between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand the 
Commission has by instinct defended the pure approach.
On the other hand the pressure for a political solution 
has pushed the Commission towards the budgetary approach,
V. Summary of part five - the finances of the Union 
(Articles 70 - 81)
Article 70 contains the general aims and provisions.
Article 71 concerns the revenue. The Union inherits 
the revenue system of the European Communities. This 
means that in the starting phase VAT will be the main 
revenue source. However, the Union may by an organic 
law create new and other revenue sources. Contrary to 
the present procedure such a step does not require 
ratification in member states.
Article 72 deals with expenditure and lays down 
that expenditure shall finance the common policies 
adopted by the Union.
Article 73 proposes a system for financial equaliza­





























































































Article 74 puts forward a proposal to divide 
responsibility between the nation states and the 
Community. It also contains a provision for multi­
annual financial programmes which will provide the 
framework for revenue and expenditure in the years ahead.
Article 75 confirms that the budget must be in 
balance. It also defines the role of lending and borrowing.
Article 76 defines the budgetary procedure which 
will be even more complicated than the already existing 
rules in Article 203 of the treaty.
Article 77 deals with provisional twelfths in case 
the budget has not been approved at the beginning of 
the financial year.
Article 78 says that the budget is implemented by 
the Commission.
Article 79 deals with audit of the accounts.
Article 80 and Article 81 concern the account and 
discharge of the annual budget.
VI. The main features of Parliament's proposal 
1. General philosophy
The starting point for the analysis of the provisions 
concerning the finances of the Union (Articles 70 - 81) 
is that Parliament does not wish to change the role of 
the budgetary system in the integration process.
Adoption of Parliament's proposal would mean that 
the budgetary system would play the same role as was 
assigned to the budgetary system in the treaty of Rome 
and the acquis communautaire which developed in the 
period 1958-1980.
It is the legal acts adopted by the Union which 
determine the size of the expenditure and member states 
are committed to put the necessary financial resources 
at the disposal of the Union.
It is explicitly said that the revenue of the Union 
shall be utilized to guarantee the implementation of 




























































































Parliament turns the blind eye to recent ideas 
concerning budgetary discipline and budgetary imbalance.
The role of the budget is to reflect what has been 
agreed upon by the decision-making institutions and the 
role of the financial system is to provide the necessary 
financial resources.
Once more Parliament turns out as the defender of 
the philosophy behind the treaty of Rome and the approach 
which was designed to facilitate and further the 
integration process.
This is not surprising when one recalls that 
Parliament was for many years the advocate of new 
common policies. With its draft treaty Parliament has 
once more invoked the need for new common policies.
The distribution of roles assigned to, on the one hand, 
the budget, and on the other, the contents of the 
Community system reflects this list of priorities.
2. National policies versus common policies
An interesting feature of the draft treaty is that 
it takes on without any hesitation the distribution of 
responsibility between, on the one hand, national 
policies and, on the other, common policies.
This is a task the present Community has evaded with 
great skill to the detriment of the Community system 
as well as the budgetary system.
The draft treaty foresees that the Commission shall 
submit a report on the division between the Union and 
the member states of the responsibility for implementing 
common actions and the financial burdens resulting 
therefrom.
The Community would be well served if this task is 
carried out properly.
With regard to substance it would do away with the 
present mess where nobody knows which tasks are assigned 
to the Community (except for the common agricultural • 




























































































alized by national subsidies) and which tasks are to 
remain at national level.
With regard to the budget such a division of labour 
would provide a much better possibility for making the 
necessary financial resources available because it could 
be proved that the national treasuries would witness 
lower expenditure in the areas where common policies 
were launched.
This is certainly a key feature in the draft treaty 
and it may be said without any reservations that the
j
present Community or a future Community on the Ipasis of 
the draft treaty - or another treaty - will only be 
viable if member states muster the political will to 
grasp the magnitude of this problem and find the 
necessary answers.
On top of the common agricultural policy, which 
should certainly continue to be a common policy, we 
would like to bring forward a few ideas of our own where 
the efforts wholly or partly could be transferred from 
national to Community level.
Industrial policy is a prime example. Not only could 
the Community pursue and increase efforts to improve the 
internal market but the common policy designed to 
promote industry in the entire European geographical 
sphere could be mapped out. In many circles it is feared 
that this would be a costly venture where the Community 
would take over lame-duck industries and run up the cost 
associated herewith. This is far from certain. The 
Community could be more selective. It could condition 
financial assistance on an equitable effort by private 
industry. It could provide equity capital instead of or 
as a supplement to loan capital. The ESPRIT programme 
is a case in point on how this could be done in a way 
which is agreeable, and hopefully profitable, to the 
Community, to the nation state and to private industry.
Research and technology also come to mind. In the 
United States or Japan there are not ten member states 




























































































should concentrate its research on common policies and 
common programmes. We should learn from the United States 
that only where research is linked to private industry 
do we get the necessary new technology. The task for 
Europe would then be to pool research and technology 
expenditure in sectors associated with the new technology 
and to provide the necessary framework for a fruitful 
cooperation between research institutes and private 
industry.
In the same breath Europe should build the necessary 
infrastructure to transfer knowledge, not only inside 
each individual nation state but also to the ten 
member states. Such an infrastructure could do two 
things for Europe. Firstly, it could launch Europe into 
the era of the information society by providing the 
necessary tool. Secondly, it would offer a springboard 
for European industry into this new era as a producer 
and a consumer. Let us not forget that the Roman 
Empire was based upon transport of people. The British 
Empire which emerged during the industrial revolution 
was based upon transport of goods. In the coming age 
it is transport of knowledge which will be decisive 
and if Europe does not master this we shall not be able 
to compete on an equal footing with USA and Japan.
These are only a few examples of what can and should 
be done at Community level. It illustrates the fact 
that the starting point in the draft treaty, namely 
national level versus Community level, is the right 
one. It also shows clearly that even if something, perhaps 
a lot, can be done without giving rise to expenditure, 
Europe will never be able to weather the point unless 
all member states show a much clearer commitment to 
increase the financial resources of the Community. It 
is also clear that such an attitude will only emerge 
if the Community and the Community institutions are 
able to demonstrate for which purposes they need the 
money and that the money will be spent in an efficient 





























































































It is explicitly said in Article 71 that when this 
treaty enters into force the revenue of the Union shall 
be of the same kind as that of the European Communities. 
The Union inherits the revenue system from the European 
Communities. However, the Union may by an organic law 
amend the nature or the basis of assessment of existing 
sources of revenue or create new ones.
The revenue sources are thus customs duties, 
agricultural import levies and VAT.
As the only buoyant element is VAT we will limit 
our analysis to that particular element.
The draft treaty rejects the present system according 
to which an upper-limit for the call up per cent of VAT 
is determined in the treaty.
The Union may call up the amount of revenue 
necessary to finance the common policies adopted by 
the Council.
This is in conformity with the main philosophy 
advanced by the Parliament concerning which is the cart 
and which is the ox, . the Community system or the budget.
This approach is brought out clearly in Article 74, 
subparagraph 2, according to which a multiannual financial 
programme lays down the projected development in the 
revenue and expenditure of the Union. These forecasts 
shall be revised annually and be used as a basis for 
the preparation of the budget.
Thus the heart of the matter is that the multiannual 
programme sets forth an annual increase in expenditure 
which governs the annual increase in the call up per cent 
of VAT.
As we shall see when we analyse the expenditure side 
the distinction between obligatory and non-obligatory 
spending is rejected and there is thus no limit neither 
for the annual increase in expenditure, nor for the 
revenue sources.
Institutionally, the procedure means that the 




























































































budget are rejected in the sense that it is the Union 
which determines common policies, expenditures and 
therefore also the total amount of revenue.
This is undoubtedly a major step. The Council has
up to now vigorously defended its exclusive powers with
regard to the revenue side of the budget. The Commis-
8 )sion's proposals to grant Parliament a say in 
increases of the VAT per cent above 1.4% were rejected 
with near-unanimity by the Council.
There has been no development for the last 6 - 1 2  
months indicating that the member states would take a 
more favourable attitude towards granting Parliament 
powers on the revenue side.
There is no reason to hide that nearly all member 
states find it a hideous idea to transfer some of their 
taxation powers to the European Parliament regardless 
of the procedure it would involve.
It is just as clear that this is a cornerstone in 
the building proposed in the draft treaty. If the 
European Parliament does not receive powers with regard 
to Community revenue it does not make much sense to 
increase its powers with regard to expenditure and 
common policies because Council could block the use 
of such powers by limiting the available revenue.
The argument is often advanced that the European 
Parliament will never be a real Parliament without powers 
to tax the European citizens. It is certainly correct 
that no Parliament has ever manifested itself without 
taxation but there is not much prospect that member 
states are willing to cross that bridge at the present 
juncture.
Another argument to support taxation powers for 
Parliament is that it would mean a more "responsible" 
Parliament taking a more restrictive attitude towards 
expenditure. This may be right or wrong but to our mind 
the argument is a little bit out of context. Either 
it is a good thing to increase expenditure for common 




























































































help to bring about a change in the mood of the European 
Parliament seems to be slightly irrelevant.
The virtues of basing the Community's finances 
on VAT are fairly clear. The VAT system is already 
working. The assessment base is well-known. It has been 
implemented in all member states. It is buoyant. It 
introduces a certain element of progressivity on the 
revenue side of the budget. So far, so good.
It is, however, to be regretted that the occasion 
has not been used to float ideas for other sources of 
revenue. j
To do so is to invite criticism for being too 
fanciful. But to limit the Community's revenue to VAT 
will pose difficulties in two respects. Firstly, there 
is certainly a limit to the amount of VAT revenue which 
the member states will forgo. Secondly, the crucial element 
in the financing system - the connection between common 
policies and revenue sources - is not being pursued.
It would have been a good idea if the European 
Parliament had put forward proposals for other sources 
of revenue which go at least some of the way towards 
meeting these preoccupations.
One possibility would have been to propose an energy 
levy, either in the form of a direct levy on energy 
consumption or an energy import levy. Both possibilities 
are feasible and both could be combined with important 
progress towards a common energy policy in the Community.
Another idea could be to focus on nation, state aids 
in the member states. According to Articles 92 - 93 of 
the treaty of Rome member states are authorized by the 
Commission to use state aids when certain conditions 
are fulfilled. The Community could go a step further 
and use the nation state aids as a tax basis for 
Community revenue. The system could work in the way 
that member states should pay a certain percentage, 
for example 10%, of authorized nation state aids into 
the Community budget. Such a system would certainly 




























































































in member states. It would serve as a Community 
instrument to promote a more efficient industrial basis 
in the whole Community while at the same time providing 
a handsome revenue for the Community.
The draft treaty does not rule out that the Community 
may need new and other revenue sources. It is stated 
explicitly in Article 71, 2, that the existing sources 
of revenue may be amended or that the Union may create 
new revenue sources.
The provisions concerning revenue sources are 
therefore not totally static but dynamic in the sense 
that it is foreseen that the Community may not in the 
longer run be viable with a financial framework confined 
to the present revenue sources.
It is, however, doubtful whether it will be possible 
to introduce new revenue sources by means of an organic 
law. Indeed, it may be said to be highly unlikely that 
the member states will give up the need for ratification 
which is presently required to create new revenue 
sources.
The draft treaty maintains the present system where 
the member states collect the revenue. It is, however, 
foreseen that the Union may set up own revenue-collecting 
authorities. In legal terms, this seems to be 
superfluous. In any case it can be taken for granted that 
the member states will not be willing to establish such 
authorities.
4. Lending and borrowing
According to the treaty and the present financial 
regulations the Community can borrow on the international 
capital markets and lend the amount for specific 
purposes defined in a legal act adopted by the Council.
There is no general provision for the Community to 
borrow and lend. It can only be done when the Council 
has so decided and specified the amount and the aims.
The legal act adopted by the Council is the pivot of 
the operations while the presentation in the budget is 




























































































The draft treaty changes this situation.
The Union may authorize the Commission to issue 
loans. The maximum amounts are defined in the annual 
budget. It is explicitly said that borrowed funds may 
only be used to finance investments.
These provisions are not totally clear and not 
totally in conformity with Article 75 which says that 
the adopted budget must be in balance.
If we are dealing with a balanced budget, as is 
the case for the present Community budget, loans may 
clearly not be used to finance expenditures covered 
by the budget. '
This problem could be solved if the draft treaty 
contained a provision for loan financing and opened 
the door for a budget where revenue would not equal 
expenditure but this is not the case.
Then we are more or less back to square one in the 
sense that loan operations can only be used for 
specific purposes in accordance with a legal act. If 
that is the idea it is difficult to see why the draft 
treaty should contain provisions on loan operations.
If it is not the case it should be more clearly explained 
which role is assigned to lending and borrowing.
It is an open question whether the proposed lending 
and borrowing differ from the task already performed 
by the European Investment Bank.
The provisions concerning lending and borrowing are 
thus among the weakest and most elusive in the draft 
treaty, which is a pity because a more important and 
a more clearly defined role for lending and borrowing 
could definitely promote the integration process.
If, on the other hand, the idea is that loan 
financing is brought in when receipts do not equal 
expenditure to balance the budget we are in fact 
operating with a system where the budget ex definitione 
is balanced. Whenever there is a shortfall of revenue, 
loan financing builds the gap. Loan financing may thus 




























































































It would have been helpful if the draft treaty had 
been clear on this point, that is whether a balanced 
budget means that receipts defined as revenue sources 
equal expenditure or a balanced budget means that 
receipts, including loan operations, equal expenditure.
5. Expenditure
Aside from doing away with the VAT ceiling the 
revenue side of the budget proposed in the draft treaty 
does not differ in principle from the present own- 
resources system. ;
The same analogy of continuation cannot be baid to 
exist for the expenditure side which in several respects 
differs fundamentally from the present budgetary system.
Even if the general philosophy - common policies 
determine expenditure - is the same in the draft treaty 
as in the treaty of Rome and acquis communautaire 
several important changes are introduced in the draft 
treaty.
The first and most important one is that the draft 
treaty rejects the present distinction between obligatory 
and non-obligatory expenditure. All expenditure is 
treated on an equal footing with regard to annual increase 
and, as we shall see later, in the budgetary procedure.
This change is in conformity with the change in the 
legislative procedure which rejects the hitherto 
exclusive powers of the Council.
Analytically, it makes good sense to supplement the 
proposed legislative procedure with a budgetary procedure 
where all sorts of expenditure are subjected to the same 
rules and procedures.
There is no reason to distinguish between obligatory 
and non-obligatory spending if and when the present 
Community system is replaced by a system where the legal 
basis for expenditure is of a quite different nature.
We must bear clearly in mind that the draft treaty 




























































































and a budgetary system which differ substantially and 
in principle from the present system.
There will be no legal acts which automatically lay 
down the size of expenditure as it is the case for 
obligatory spending under the present rules.
There is no maximum rate of increase for non-obliga- 
tory expenditure, and the finely-tuned balance between 
Council and Parliament which is brought about by the 
present system is replaced by quite another balance of 
powers.
The annual increase for total expenditure i^ determined 
in the framework of multiannual financial programmes.
This is clearly one of the cases where the draft 
treaty hopes that political wisdom will prevail because 
it is not foreseen what happens if such programmes 
cannot be agreed upon or if they give rise to expenditure 
out of proportion with realities or what member 
states are willing to accept. It is said that the 
programmes shall be revised annually but that is one 
of many provisions which in themselves are admirable ones 
but at the same time open up for confrontation between 
the institutions and the member states.
The draft treaty contains a modest but very useful 
provision which the Community should have taken up long 
ago, namely to evaluate annually the effectiveness of 
the common policies in view of the costs associated 
therewith.
There is no doubt that for too long a period 
expenditure has gone on rising in the Community without 
a thorough analysis of the common policies and the 
comrpon actions to prove whether the money is spent 
for the designed purposes and, if so, it is spent in 
the right way.
A cost-benefit analysis would do the Community a lot 
of good.
If the result were that some of the money was not 
well spent then the Community could make savings and 





























































































If, on the other hand, the analysis proves that 
the money was well spent the Community would remove 
the suspicion that this is not so and be in a much 
better position to increase spending.
This provision in the draft treaty would be a very 
useful instrument when deciding on the division of 
responsibility between, on the one hand, the national 
level and, on the other, the Community level and it 
would go a long way towards providing the basis for 
the multiannual financial programmes. All assuming 
that the analysis is carried out in an efficient way 
and that failures are exposed and not stowed away.
6. Financial equalization
It is specifically said in Article 73 that a system 
of financial equalization shall be introduced in order 
to alleviate excessive economic imbalances between the 
regions.
It is, however, not said how such a system should 
work. The starting point for an analysis must be whether 
it should work on the revenue or on the expenditure side 
of the budget.
If the idea is to introduce a financial equalization 
system on the revenue side the effect would be a complete 
change in the own-resources system. We have seen in 
chapter II that the own-resources system does not take 
relative welfare into account. If this were to be done 
to ensure that member states with a GDP per capita 
below Community average should pay less than member 
states with a GDP per capita above Community average 
a complete recast of the system would be called for.
Of course, such a change could be implemented if the 
member states were willing to do so. But it should not 
be obscured that it would mean a replacement of the 
own-resources system by quite another system.
In legal terms, the effect would be that revenue 




























































































of the Community from the moment of collection because 
they had to be subjected to a multiplication factor 
reflecting relative welfare. Or in other words, the 
revenue had to pass through national treasuries in order 
to be reduced or increased by a multiplication factor 
and only after that process had been completed the 
amount would be transferred to the Community. Such a 
system is perfectly feasible but only if the national 
treasuries were introduced as an accounting machine 
between, on the one hand, the citizens and the 
enterprises and, on the other, the Community.
This point is more clearly seen when keeping in mind 
that the same effect could be obtained by paying in VAT 
according to the present rules and introducing a special 
levy on member states with a GDP per capita above 
Community average and a special subsidy on member 
states with a GDP below Community average.
The effects for VAT as an own resource have been
9)analysed in a recent work by G. Isaac . The conclusion 
is that a multiplication factor means that any idea of 
VAT as an own resource (illusory or real) cannot be 
maintained. In this case the Community will operate 
with a taux d'appel and not a taux d 'imposition. If 
it is doubtful whether the VAT in its present shape 
is an own resource such doubts will not any longer 
persist if a multiplication factor is introduced.
It is doubtful whether such a system would bring 
about a real equalization. It would of course mean a 
transfer from rich to poor member states but it would 
not necessarily mean a transfer of money from rich to 
poor citizens.
This point can be illustrated by an example. Denmark 
would pay a sum of money to Greece but to do so all 
Danish citizens would be taxed regardless of their 
income and all Greek citizens regardless of their 
income would witness an alleviation of their fiscal 




























































































citizen would be taxed in order to alleviate the fiscal 
burden of a rich Greek citizen.
This is really the heart of the matter because it 
would mean that we are moving away from the idea of a 
Community to a more traditional pattern of international 
cooperation where member states are transferring money 
between each other. This can hardly be what the 
European Parliament wants.
To avoid this effect the equalization system would 
have to be introduced on the expenditure side.
It would mean that schemes to support poor regions 
and poor citizens would be implemented. The Social Fund 
is already performing this task with more or less success 
Similar schemes or funds could be set up.
With the equalization system operating on the 
expenditure side of the budget we are back in the main­
stream of Parliament's philosophy regarding the Community 
system and the role of the budget.
7. Budgetary procedure
In the present budgetary procedure (Article 203 of 
the treaty) we have the following distribution of powers 
between the institutions:
The Commission proposes.
The Council decides on a draft budget which is 
forwarded to Parliament. The Council takes the 
final decision with regard to obligatory spending. 
During the institutional interplay with Parliament 
Council has an important say with regard to non- 
obligatory spending. It may even be said that 
Council by way of the maximum rate of increase 
exclusively can define the framework for non- 
obligatory spending but not its composition.
- The President of Parliament finally approves
the budget. Parliament may forward modifications 




























































































in this area. With regard to non-obligatory 
spending Parliament has the final word but 
cannot surpass the maximum rate of increase 
without the consent of the Council.
It is thus the Council which has the upper-hand in 
this institutional interplay.
The draft treaty proposed by the European Parliament 
constitutes a sweeping change.
It is still the task of the Commission to forward a 
preliminary budget.
The Council finds itself stripped of all powers to 
decide and is relegated to the institution which makes 
amendments to the Commission's proposal so that 
Parliament can decide.
Parliament is the institution which in the end takes 
all decisions with regard to size as well as composition 
of the budget.
It is no overstatement to say that the budgetary 
procedure and the distribution of powers between the 
institutions have been completely turned around.
It becomes clear already in the first phrase which 
says that the Commission forwards the draft budget to 
the budget authority. According to Article 203 of the 
treaty the preliminary draft budget is forwarded to the 
Council.
Under the present rules it is the Council which 
establishes a draft budget by a Council decision and 
forwards it to Parliament.
This is not the case in Article 76 in the draft 
treaty. According to the proposed procedure the Council 
may approve amendments and the amended budget is forwarded 
to Parliament.
The implication of this is that unless Council agrees 
on an amendment the appropriations in the Commission's 
draft budget stand. Under the present rules there is 





























































































It is a minor point but may not prove to be so in 
practice that amendments according to the draft treaty 
shall be approved by simple majority. In a Community of 
twelve member states, approval of amendments calls for 
the vote of seven member states. Judging by experience 
in recent years it is highly unlikely that seven member 
states may agree on an amendment and the proposed 
procedure would thus mean that the large majority of 
the appropriations proposed by the Commission would 
stand.
IThe next step in the procedure is a first reading 
by Parliament. Parliament may amend by an absolute 
majority the amendments of the Council. Parliament 
may also on its own initiative approve other amendments 
by a simple majority.
This brings out the general thrust of the proposal 
which is to increase Parliament's powers.
The third step gives the Commission the possibility 
to oppose amendments approved by the Council or by the 
Parliament. If the Commission chooses to do so the 
appropriations are referred back to the relevant 
institution which will have to make a fresh decision, 
this time by a qualified majority.
The fourth step gives the Council the right to amend 
the amendments approved by the Parliament. This can only 
be done by a qualified majority defined in Article 23,
2, b, as three fifths of the weighted votes cast.
After having done so the Council forwards once more 
the draft budget to Parliament which at its second 
reading may reject amendments of the Council by a 
qualified majority.
This finishes the budgetary procedure and Parliament 
finally adopts the budget by an absolute majority.
It is clear that the Council can never decide 
finally on an appropriation or reject amendments 
proposed by Parliament. The Council can only make amend­
ments either to the original draft forwarded by the 




























































































The only powers which are given to the Council are 
that by a qualified majority it can request the 
Commission to submit a new draft.
The proposed procedure is very complex, even 
Byzantine. It is difficult to see why and how such a 
procedure is proposed when the aim quite clearly is to 
transfer the decision-making powers from Council to 
Parliament.
It is difficult to see why the draft treaty in some 
cases proposes simple majority, in other cases qualified 
majority and in other cases again absolute majority.
It makes good sense to use different voting procedures 
under the present rules because pf the distinction 
between obligatory and non-obligatory spending and the 
fine-tuned balance between Council and Parliament.
But it does not make much sense under the system 
proposed in the draft treaty which does away with the 
distinction between different types of expenditure and 
place the decision-making exclusively with Parliament.
It looks as if the authors have wished to forward a 
procedure which at least bears some resemblances to 
Article 203 while not containing any of the important 
features of this article.
VII. The implication for economic integration
In the last 30 years economic integration, among 
other things in the shape of economic and monetary union, 
has played a predominant role in the academic and 
political debate. Many scholars have tried to map out 
how to facilitate and promote the economic integration 
and many studies have been produced.
As the European Community is the only genuine 
example of economic integration, it is only natural that 
many of the ideas have been put forward in the European 
debate and that many of the European experiences have 




























































































In 1977 the Commission sponsored the MacDougall- 
report'*'^ on the role of public finance in European 
integration.
The MacDougall-report is the main reference work to 
determine whether or not financial measures will promote 
the integration process.
It is both disappointing and regrettable that the 
provisions on finance in the draft treaty do not really 
make an attempt to take up the challenge of the 
MacDougall-report to design a budgetary and financial 
system suited to promote economic integration, j
In fact, the MacDougall-report has pointed the way 
ahead in calculating the size of Community expenditure 
necessary for different stages of the integration process. 
It is said that in a pre-federal integration stage 
Community expenditure should rise to between 2% and 2.5% 
of total Community gross domestic product.
The next stage could be a federation with expenditure 
running at 5-7% of GDP (2-3 percentage points higher 
if defence expenditure is included). At this stage the 
European federation would encompass many common policies 
to increase productivity and living standard while at 
the same time alleviating regional differences.
In the final stage total Community expenditure would 
amount to 20-25% of GDP or perhaps even higher and 
then place a European federation on an equal footing with 
USA.
To our mind, the draft treaty would have stood a 
better chance if it had been based firmly on the solid 
theoretical background provided by the MacDougall-report.
This could have been done by incorporating in the 
draft treaty a gradual phasing in of higher Community 
expenditure as replacement for expenditure at a national 
level. Changes in the expenditure as well as the revenue 
could have been planned at pre-determined levels which 
would have given a clear picture of where the Community 




























































































The MacDougall-report analyses efforts to equalize 
income differences in existing federations. It comes to 
the conclusion that interregional differences have been 
reduced by up to 40%, even if federal expenditure amounts 
to a very small size measured in terms of GDP. The exact 
figure for USA is federal expenditure amounting to between 
2% or 3% of GDP to reduce interregional income differences 
by up to 40%.
Nor is it discussed or foreseen in the draft treaty 
whether we should use the Community budget to influence 
the business cycle.
It is quite evident that this has not been the case 
in the past because a budget of less than 1% of total 
Community GDP will not have any tangible effect on the 
business cycle.
This will, however, not be true if total expenditure 
rises and reaches for example between 3% and 5% of GDP and 
the possibility for influencing the business cycle will 
grow as expenditure rises in per cent of GDP.
It may or it may not be the intention of the authors 
to see the budget in such a role but the topic is not 
raised, either directly or indirectly.
The same applies to the distribution of responsi­
bility between the private and the public sectors. In 
many member states this question is in the forefront of 
the political debate and the question of which tasks 
should be fulfilled by the public sector and which tasks 
should be taken up by the private sector is giving rise 
to many reports of different nature.
As a more specific measure, loan transactions can 
be used to promote a real European capital market. If 
and when lending and borrowing is included in the 
financing of the Community's activities the Community 
clearly forgoes a possibility to promote economic 
integration if the opportunity is not used for building 
a European capital market.
In the longer perspective there seems to be a gap in 
the analysis concerning the relationship between 




























































































an economic and monetary union in Europe we have to 
establish consistency between what is done by monetary 
policy and what is done by fiscal policy. There must, 
so to speak, be parallel progress. This is a point 
which has been elaborated by Allen and Kenen'*'^ .
They do not find a fiscal union absolutely necessary 
as a supplement to a monetary union. But it would 
certainly facilitate things a lot. The essential point 
is, however, that it is difficult to ensure consistency 
between monetary policy and fiscal policy if decisions 
are taken on different levels and in this respect the 
draft treaty poses a very serious problem, indeed. If 
total Community expenditure rises to a magnitude where 
it influences the business cycle and plays a role in the 
integration process fiscal decisions would be taken on 
national as well as Community level. It is far from 
certain that the same would be the case for monetary 
policy. In any case we would face an acute dilemma of 
economic policy decisions in different areas being 
taken on different levels with the clear risk that 
incompatible decisions are taken.
The finance provisions cannot be said to promote the 
integration process and the reader of the draft treaty 
is left with the impression that this aspect has not 
really been taken into account when the finance 
provisions were drawn up.
VIII. Conclusion
Our general appreciation of the finance provisions 
in the draft treaty is that it is primarily the 
institutional aspect which has interested the authors.
The main goal has clearly been not only to increase 
Parliament's powers but to shift nearly all of the 
present powers invested in the Council to the Parliament. 
That may be good or bad according to political 
preference. Clearly the authors are of the opinion 





























































































With regard to the specific provisions many of the 
proposals appear to be very cumbersome in practice.
This goes for example for the complicated budgetary 
procedure in Article 76.
There is a certain logic in the institutional 
system put forward and the role assigned to budgetary 
and financial questions. The transfer of legislative 
powers from the Council to the Union and the removal 
of the distinction between obligatory and non-obliga- 
tory spending is a case in point, but that also means 
that weaknesses in the legislative and decision-making 
areas will have repercussions for the budgetary and 
finance provisions.
The general philosophy is coherent and very close­
ly follows the one which lies behind the treaty of 
Rome, that is: the contents of the Community system
determines the size and composition of the budget 
and the own-resources system provides the necessary 
financial means.
It is, however, regrettable that the authors have 
focused so narrowly on the institutional aspect of 
the finance provisions that the possibility for 
shaping a budgetary and financial system in harmony 
with the development of new and other common policies 
has not been used.
Member states are required to accept very important 
changes. Firstly, the expenditure level and according­
ly also the revenue is fixed by the Union without 
any ceiling. Secondly, the Union may by an organic 
law (no ratification is required by member states) 
introduce other revenue sources than the existing 
ones.
Judged by recent experience it is not likely that 
the proposed transfer of powers to the European 
Parliament and the far-reaching changes regarding 
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